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UNTOLD TRUTHS: THE EXCLUSION OF 
ENFORCED STERILIZATIONS FROM THE 
PERUVIAN TRUTH COMMISSION’S  
FINAL REPORT 
Jocelyn E. Getgen* 
Abstract: This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced sterilization 
cases from the Peruvian Truth Commission's investigation and Final 
Report effectively erases State responsibility and decreases the likeli-
hood for justice and reparations for women victims-survivors of State-
sponsored violence in Peru. In a context of deep cultural and economic 
divides and violent conflict, this Article recounts how the State's Family 
Planning Program violated Peruvian women's reproductive rights by 
sterilizing low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women without 
informed consent. This Article argues that these systematic reproductive 
injustices constitute an act of genocide, proposes an independent in-
quiry, and advocates for a more inclusive investigation and final report 
for future truth commissions whose goals include truth, accountability, 
and justice for all victims-survivors of state-sponsored violence.  Leaders 
responsible for the enforced sterilization of more than 200,000 Peruvian 
women, including former President Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori, must be 
held accountable for past violations in order to fully realize future rec-
onciliation and justice in Peru. 
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of the world who have suffered and died as a result of government campaigns of enforced 
sterilization. May their voices be heard and may we move toward a world where reproduc-
tive justice and freedom are rights enjoyed by all. 
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“[E]very society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past 
events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes 
came to be committed . . . .”1 
Introduction 
 Does time heal all wounds? Can a transitioning democratic society 
move forward without fully facing the human rights violations that 
plague its past? Or can only truth and justice reconcile large-scale 
abuses? Difficult lessons from the recent past have taught societies and 
nations that legitimate democracies require political and personal ac-
countability reinforced by the rule of law.2 International human rights 
treaties thus impose upon states a duty to investigate, criminally prose-
cute, and punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity.3 Although 
state actions taken in response to gross violations of human rights are 
never truly adequate when communities, families, and individuals suf-
fer irreparable harms, inaction is invariably worse.4 A state’s failure to 
respond appropriately and justly to gross human rights abuses can give 
victims the sense that their perpetrators emerged either victorious or 
with clean hands.5 
 The Peruvian government’s response to twenty years of human 
rights abuses from 1980 to 2000 included creating a truth commission 
with a broad mandate to “promote national reconciliation, the rule of 
justice and the strengthening of the constitutional democratic re-
gime.”6 By forming the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (CVR),7 the State initiated a process of achieving national recon-
ciliation through an attempt to correct the historical record, provide 
a collective memory and preserve the possibility of criminal account-
ability and justice.8 
                                                                                                                      
1 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Jus-
tice 328 (The New Press 2006) (1999) (quoting the IAC Annual Report 193 (Sept. 26, 
1986)). 
2 See John Borneman, Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability 
in Postsocialist Europe 3 (1997). 
3 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 327–28. 
4 See Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair 
15–16 (2002). 
5 See id. at 16. 
6 Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM art. 1 ( June 2, 2001) (Peru). 
7 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. 
8 See Amnesty Int’l, Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission—A First Step Towards a 
Country Without Injustice, AI Index AMR 46/003/2004, 1–2 (Aug. 2004); Priscilla B. 
Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions 24–31 
(2002) (discussing the basic objectives of a truth commission: “to discover, clarify, and for-
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 In many respects, the CVR is a model for future truth commissions 
that strive to end impunity, attend to the needs of victims, initiate state 
investigations and systemic reforms, gain a critical perspective to con-
front internal conflict, and condemn individuals and institutions for 
abuses.9 Although this Commission serves as an ambitious and inclusive 
mechanism for accountability and truth-telling, it fails to provide a re-
cord and voice to more than 200,000 marginalized, indigenous 
Quechua-speaking women in Peru who were victims of a State-
sponsored enforced sterilization campaign.10 The exclusion of large-
scale reproductive rights abuses committed against the poorest and 
most marginalized sectors of Peruvian society demonstrates a weakness 
of the CVR, impedes justice for these individuals, and provides further 
lessons for truth commissions of the future.11 With large-scale human 
rights abuses occurring in conflicts and transitioning regimes around 
the world—the internal and international conflicts in Iraq, for exam-
ple12—the transitional justice community must responsibly ensure that 
the collective memory includes all victims and that their voices are not 
                                                                                                                      
mally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to jus-
tice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to 
promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past”); Minow, supra note 4, at 24–27. 
See generally Richard A. Wilson, The Politics and Reconciliation in South Africa: Le-
gitimizing the Post-Apartheid State (2001) (describing the truth-telling and reconcilia-
tion functions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission). 
9 See Comisión de Entrega de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Hatun 
Willakuy: Versión Abreviada del Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Recon-
ciliación 433–65 (2004); Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n, Final Report, General 
Conclusions passim (2003) available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclu- 
siones.php [hereinafter Final Report]. 
10 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 19–20. See generally Final Report, supra note 9. These 
women predominantly lived in rural areas in the Andes and Peruvian Amazon. Amnesty 
Int’l, supra note 8, at 20. 
11 See discussion infra Part III. 
12 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Postconflict Justice in Iraq, 33 Hum. Rts. 15 passim (2006) 
(highlighting the violent and widespread conflict in Iraq and advocating for a post-conflict 
justice strategy that includes prosecution of offenders, a victim compensation scheme, the 
creation of a historic commission, and revamping the Iraqi legal system); Jennifer Moore, 
Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal Framework for Coordinated Action to 
Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 43 passim (2004) (finding a legal 
obligation to promote human security in certain international human rights documents and 
arguing that security will not be established until political and civil liberties and secure and 
basic economic and social needs are met); NGO Coordination Comm. in Iraq & Oxfam Int’l, 
Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq, Briefing Paper 105, July 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/18_07_07_oxfam_iraq.pdf (calling for an 
increase in humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq and estimating that eight million 
Iraqis are in need of emergency aid). 
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silenced in the future processes of truth and reconciliation.13 Further-
more, with Peru’s current step toward accountability and transitional 
justice—the trial of former President Alberto Ken’ya Fujimori— advo-
cates and other members of civil society must push for reproductive 
justice for the victims-survivors of enforced sterilization in Peru in or-
der to move toward truth, justice, and reconciliation for all.14 
 This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced sterilizations 
cases in the CVR’s investigation and Final Report effectively erases State 
responsibility and greatly decreases the likelihood that Peru will seek 
justice for the victims of these violations of reproductive rights. Part I 
provides an overview of the sharp cultural and economic divides in Pe-
ruvian society, examines the history of violent conflict in Peru from 
1980 to 2000, and recounts how healthcare providers violated Peruvian 
women’s reproductive rights when they sterilized low-income, indige-
nous Quechua-speaking women either against their will or without in-
formed consent through the State’s Family Planning Program. Part II 
discusses the creation and implementation of the CVR through its ex-
ecutive mandate. Part III challenges the reasons for excluding these 
cases in the Commission’s investigation and Final Report and also ex-
amines the effects of these omissions. Part IV proposes an independent 
inquiry with regard to these abuses and advocates for a more inclusive 
investigation and final report for future truth commissions whose goals 
include truth, accountability, and justice. 
                                                                                                                      
13 Cf. David M. Crane, White Man’s Justice: Applying International Justice After Regional 
Third World Conflicts, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1683, 1684 (2006) (advocating for victims’ cen-
tral role in the truth, reconciliation, and justice process). See generally Kader Asmal et al., 
Reconciliation Through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance 
(1997) (discussing the need for reconciliation through collective memory and corrective 
action); James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided 
Nation? (2004) (discussing the truth and reconciliation process of transitional justice in 
South Africa); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000) (discussing various concepts 
of transitional justice and the rule of law in times of political change); Ruti Teitel, The Law 
and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 837 (2005) (reviewing 
contemporary developments in transitional justice). 
14 See supra notes 8, 12; Fujimori on Trial: Accountability in Action, http://fujimorion 
trial.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (providing news and analysis regarding the Fujimori 
trial). 
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I. The Paths to Violent Conflict 
A. Indigenous Peoples in Peruvian Society 
 Tawantinsuyu’s15 destruction and Peru’s birth began when the 
Spanish Conquistadors invaded Incan lands, captured the last Incan 
ruler, Atahualpa, and massacred thousands of Incan warriors in the 
Andean city of Cajamarca in 1532.16 During the first one hundred years 
of colonial rule and oppression in Peru, the indigenous population in 
the Andes region plummeted from nine million to six hundred-
thousand people.17 From this swift defeat and near destruction of the 
highland indigenous peoples of Peru emerged the myth of the “van-
quished race”: that the Incas and their descendants lacked decision-
making ability and individual initiative and, thus, “could or should be 
exterminated, ‘civilized,’ instructed, or saved.”18 
 Spanish colonial rule guaranteed impoverishment and death for 
many indigenous Peruvians and perpetuated the fragmented and di-
vided structures that continue to exist in Peruvian society today.19 First, 
a geographical divide exists between the coastal region—predominately 
urban, white and Spanish-speaking—and the highlands—mostly rural, 
indigenous and Quechua-speaking.20 In addition, the coastal region 
boasts an overwhelming majority of the nation’s wealth and political 
power, and, as a result, political and economic programs in past re-
gimes have largely ignored or neglected the needs of the indigenous 
peoples in the highlands and rainforest regions.21 Moreover, there are 
racial and ethnic gaps that divide Peruvian society among groups of 
Spanish descent (criollos), mixed Spanish and indigenous descent (mes-
tizos), indigenous of Andean origin who have moved to the urban cen-
                                                                                                                      
15 Tawantinsuyu is the name of the pre-colonial Incan Empire. Encyclopedia Bri-
tanica, Scurlock—Tirah IX, 845 (15th ed. 1983). 
16 See The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics 81, 102–06 (Orin Starn et al. 
eds., 1995). 
17 Id. at 82. 
18 Id. at 81–82. 
19 See id. at 112; Americas Watch, Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Re-
turn to Democracy 1 (1992). 
20 Americas Watch, supra note 19, at 1; Carlos Iván Degregori, Comm’r, Peruvian 
Truth & Reconciliation Comm’n, Questions of Violence and Racism in a Diverse Society: 
The Findings of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Address at Cornell 
Law School (Nov. 28, 2005) (transcript available with the author). 
21 Americas Watch, supra note 19, at 1. 
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ters of the country (cholos) and indigenous who continue to live a more 
traditional way of life in the highlands (indígenas).22 
 Although today indigenous groups are beginning to organize po-
litically and socially to demand individual and collective rights from the 
State,23 invidious discrimination and economic, cultural and social di-
vides still exist at all levels of Peruvian society.24 In Peru, indigenous 
peoples continue to be seen as second-class citizens, a racist view estab-
lished through these divides, their situations of extreme poverty, and 
the inadequate access to basic health care and education.25 
B. Twenty Years of Violent Internal Conflict in Peru 
1. Setting the Stage for State-Sponsored Violence 
 Before the Peruvian government committed more than 200,000 
enforced sterilizations against indigenous Quechua-speaking women 
through its Family Planning Program during the 1990s, the internal 
conflict between insurgent groups and the State created an environ-
ment of fear in which few openly questioned government policies.26 At 
first, violence in Peru erupted in 1980 when the Maoist armed gov-
ernment opposition group, the Shining Path,27 initiated a political, 
“popular” war against the State.28 At that time, Peru had begun its tran-
                                                                                                                      
22 See Maria Elena García, Making Indigenous Citizens: Identity, Development, 
and Multicultural Activism in Peru 27–29 (2005); Degregori, supra note 20. 
23 See generally García, supra note 22 (discussing the issues surrounding indigenous 
mobilization and citizenship in Peru). 
24 See Americas Watch, supra note 19, at 1–3; Enrique Mayer, The Articulated 
Peasant: Household Economies in the Andes 322 (2002); Degregori, supra note 20. 
25 See Americas Watch, supra note 19, at 1–3; Mayer, supra note 24, at 322–23; 
Degregori, supra note 20. 
26 See Eduardo González Cueva, The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Challenge of Impunity, in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond 
Truth versus Justice 70, 71–72 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); 
Degregori, supra note 20. 
27 Sendero Luminoso. 
28 See Steve J. Stern, Introduction to Part III, in Shining and Other Paths: War and 
Society in Peru, 1980–1995, at 262–63 (Steve J. Stern ed., 1998); Degregori, supra note 
20 (arguing that the CVR’s final report highlighted the political will of the Shining Path 
rather than digging deeper into the “structural violence” and poverty of the State). Al-
though the CVR’s report acknowledged that these structural concepts formed the back-
ground of the conflict, the concepts alone were not seen as enough to explain the extent 
of the violence suffered. See Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, many social movements 
of the time used the structural factors and widespread poverty to justify violence. See id. 
The Shining Path actually argued that the State and the Peruvian people should not chas-
tise the group for killing some reactionaries when many more multitudes of people were 
 
2009] Enforced Sterilization & the Peruvian Truth Commission 7 
sition from a military regime to a civilian democracy; however, the Mao-
ist faction did not participate in the left’s incorporation into the politi-
cal system.29 Instead of taking part in elections, Shining Path members 
launched their communist-Maoist campaign by attacking the voter reg-
istration office in Chuschi, a small town in the central highlands of the 
Ayacucho province, before dawn on Election Day in 1980.30 This politi-
cal spark ignited a fire in a country with great disparity between rich 
and poor, abject rural poverty, geographic exclusion in the Andes and 
Amazon regions, and invidious discrimination and racism among eth-
nic and racial groups.31 
 Next, the absence of a strong, unchallenged democratic transition, 
combined with the presence of the revolutionary movement of the 
Shining Path, caused the government to react with authoritarian rule 
and military force, which then served to escalate the initial outbreaks of 
violence.32 Fernando Belaúnde’s newly-elected government, in re-
sponse to increasing social unrest, imposed states of emergency in de-
partments throughout the country.33 In addition, the Armed Forces 
used racial profiling and killed indiscriminately in areas of conflict with 
the Peruvian government’s knowledge and acquiescence.34 In this con-
text, the Shining Path gained support and momentum as some rural 
peasant communities began to view the guerillas as the lesser of two 
evils during the beginning of the armed struggle.35 
 At first, certain peasant communities, such as those in the district 
of Chuschi, also backed the Shining Path’s efforts because the Shin-
ing Path’s short-term goals aligned with their own: to drive out ene-
mies in their towns who were gaining power, to establish better-quality 
                                                                                                                      
dying of hunger and malnutrition each day in Peru. See id.; González Cueva, supra note 26, 
at 71. 
29 Anna-Britt Coe, From Anti-Natalist to Ultra-Conservative: Restricting Reproductive Choice 
in Peru, 12 Reprod. Health Matters 56, 59 (2004); see Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining 
Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru 10–11 (Robin Kirk trans., The Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press 1999) (1990). 
30 Gorriti, supra note 29, at 17; Billie Jean Isbell, Shining Path and Peasant Responses in 
Rural Ayacucho, in The Shining Path of Peru 77, 89–90 (David Scott Palmer ed., 2d ed. 
1994). 
31 See Degregori, supra note 20. 
32 See id.; González Cueva, supra note 26, at 71–72 (noting that “[t]he combined action 
of guerilla organizations, military units and local self-defense groups acting under the 
command, or with the acquiescence of the state” actually caused the bulk of the deaths 
that the CVR estimates occurred during the whole twenty-year period). 
33 See Americas Watch, supra note 19, at 6. 
34 See Degregori, supra note 20. 
35 See id. The slogan at the time was that the “Shining Path has one thousand eyes and 
one thousand ears,” while the State fights blindly. Id. 
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schools, and to end government corruption.36 To some communities, 
the revolution and “New Peru” meant that they would finally free 
themselves from abusive bureaucrats and public officials and return 
to the consensus framework with which traditional authorities gov-
erned in the past.37 In time, however, the Shining Path began to reor-
ganize peasant communities toward its ideology of a “future without 
distinctions” in class or wealth and to assume authoritarian power 
over them; as a result, the Andean people came to see the Shining 
Path as nothing more than new oppressors.38 “[I]nstead of becoming 
the revolutionary vanguard in the communities, Shining Path [was] 
perceived . . . as a new form of ñaqa, the supernatural being that robs 
body fat” in Andean mythology to pay off a debt.39 The Shining Path 
eventually lost what little peasant community support it had, and An-
dean citizens complied with military orders to organize civil defense 
patrols in order to resist the efforts of Shining Path insurgents.40 
 The Shining Path focused its class war in the countryside, the 
“principal theater” of its actions, and complemented these efforts by 
supporting armed strikes and mobilizations in the city.41 At first, the 
Shining Path’s motives remained a mystery to most urban Peruvians; 
the cryptic messages— “Teng Hsiao-ping, son of a bitch” —wrapped 
around dead dogs hanging from streetlamps in Lima seemed to them 
to border on insanity.42 Soon, however, the dynamite attacks and kill-
ings intensified, and the uprising turned into a bloodbath that could 
no longer be underestimated or ignored.43 
 While the Armed Forces devised new strategies to defeat the Shin-
ing Path, the nation’s social and political composition shifted under the 
structural factors of a modernizing Peru.44 First, a significant number 
of Peruvians migrated from the rural areas to the cities, largely due to 
the development of a market economy, increased transportation, and 
as displaced persons of the armed conflict.45 In addition, the relatively 
                                                                                                                      
36 Isbell, supra note 30, at 89–90. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. at 90–92. 
39 Id. at 92. 
40 See id. at 79–80, 87. 
41 Gorroti, supra note 29, at 68. 
42 Id. at 76, 78. 
43 See id. at 94–95, 104. The Shining Path developed the idea of the “quota”: the will-
ingness and expectation of its members to sacrifice their own lives when asked to do so by 
the party. Id. at 104. 
44 See Degregori, supra note 20. 
45 See id. The number of desplazados (internally displaced persons) exceeded 600,000 at 
the height of the armed conflict. Id. 
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independent media and political and social organizations proved that 
some level of democracy existed and fostered a rejection of the totali-
tarianism of the Shining Path movement.46 Finally, in 1992, the Peru-
vian police antiterrorism unit captured Abimael Guzmán, the leader of 
the Shining Path, who subsequently negotiated peace accords with the 
Fujimori government and facilitated the fast demoralization and defeat 
of Shining Path sympathizers.47 
 Guzmán’s capture followed Alberto Fujimori’s election in 1990 
and “self-coup” (autogolpe), which abruptly ended the rule of law in 
1992.48 Fujimori implemented a strategy to combat an economic crisis 
and government subversion; he suppressed civil liberties and eroded 
political institutions and notions of accountability.49 Then, when faced 
with congressional opposition to his oppressive measures, he joined 
forces with the military, suspended the Constitution, censored the me-
dia, dissolved the National Congress, and incapacitated the judiciary.50 
Even after the capture of the leading subversives and the awareness of a 
crumbling insurgency, Fujimori’s repressive authoritarian regime used 
public fear and isolated incidences of violence to justify continued hu-
man rights abuses and political suppression throughout the 1990s.51 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Americas Watch, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the media as investigators, “in-
formal ombudsmen,” and as a channel for opinion and information in Peruvian society); 
Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, the Shining Path did not have an alternative to offer 
the peasant populations after the destruction of the “old order.” Degregori, supra note 20. 
Most significantly, the movement ignored the needs of the peasant families in the Andes. 
Degregori, supra note 20. 
47 See Degregori, supra note 20; González Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; see also Stern, su-
pra note 28, at 297. 
48 See González Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; Stern, supra note 28, at 417; see also Inter-
view with Eduardo González Cueva, Senior Associate, International Center for Transitional 
Justice, former Director, Public Hearings and Victims and Witnesses Protection Unit, Pe-
ruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 
González Cueva Interview]. 
49 Final Report, supra note 9, § II(D); see Catherine M. Conaghan, Fujimori’s 
Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere 29, 252–53 (2005). 
50 See Kent Anderson, An Asian Pinochet?—Not Likely: The Unfulfilled International Law 
Promise in Japan’s Treatment of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, 38 Stan. J. Int’l L. 
177, 180–81 (2002); González Cueva, supra note 26, at 72. 
51 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 181; González Cueva, supra note 26, at 73; González 
Cueva Interview, supra note 48. 
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2. State-Sponsored Enforced Sterilizations Under the Family Planning 
Program: “Voluntary” Surgical Contraception (Anticoncepción 
Quirúrgica Voluntaria—AQV ) 
 Three months after President Fujimori took office in 1990, he an-
nounced a “birth control policy” as a way to bring equal access to con-
traception for the nation’s poor.52 At that time, however, high inflation, 
a lack of public funding, a focus on the internal conflict, and legal bar-
riers in place against sterilizations forced the government to proceed 
slowly despite its support for reforms in family planning programs in 
Peru.53 Fujimori’s reelection gave his regime a strong mandate for im-
plementing its plans, and in 1995, Congress approved a modification of 
the National Population Law of 1985 to permit sterilization as a family 
planning method.54 At the same time, Fujimori garnered support from 
feminists and advocates for the rights of women when, in 1995, he at-
tended and spoke in Beijing at the Fourth International World Confer-
ence on Women.55 
 In 1996, after finding an inverse relationship between population 
growth and economic growth, Fujimori’s administration quietly im-
plemented a demographic policy for population control.56 A stable 
economy and widespread political support allowed Fujimori’s regime to 
openly confront the Catholic Church and its strong political positions 
with regard to reproductive rights and choice.57 Additionally, interna-
                                                                                                                      
52 Carlos E. Aramburu, Politics and Reproductive Health: A Dangerous Con-
nection 7 (2002), available at http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Seminars/Details/Seminars/ 
Bangkok2002/03BangkokAramburu.pdf; Carlos Cáceres et al., Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights Policies in Peru: Unveiling False Paradoxes, in SexPolitics: Reports from the Front 
Lines 127, 137 (Richard Parker et al. eds., 2006). The traditional demographic argument 
was coupled with the argument advocating for equal rights, which focused on individual 
and family rights. Aramburu, supra, at 8. 
53 See Aramburu, supra note 51, at 8. 
54 See id. at 7–8. 
55 See Maruja Barrig, The Persistence of Memory: Feminism and the State in 
Peru in the 1990s, Civil Society and Democratic Governance in the Andes and the 
Southern Cone Comparative Regional Project 12–13 (1999). 
56 See Subcomisión Investigadora de Personas e Instituciones Involucradas en 
Acciones de Anticoncepción Quirúrgica Voluntaria [Sub-Comm’n to Investigate 
People and Insts. Involved in Voluntary Surgical Contraception Proc.], Informe 
Final Sobre la Aplicación de la Anticoncepción Quirúrgica Voluntaria 11 (2002) 
[hereinafter AQV]; Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 138; Coe, supra note 29, at 61. 
57 See Coe, supra note 29, at 59 (asserting that when Fujimori first took power, he faced 
many challenges, including violent internal conflict, a weak economy, and inflation. To 
address these concerns, Fujimori needed the backing of the Catholic Church (which op-
posed modern contraceptive methods)); Comité de America Latina y el Caribe para 
la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer [Latin American and Caribbean Commit-
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tional and domestic pressures existed to address the widening gap 
among socio-economic classes of Peruvians; thus, Fujimori’s govern-
ment promoted contraceptive services to “the most deprived sectors of 
society” in a stated effort to alleviate poverty on a massive scale.58 
 During this time, Fujimori continued to actively promote universal 
access to contraception for women.59 His political discourse invoked 
principles of social justice and human rights; his rhetoric even included 
using the reproductive justice movement’s language, stating that “poor 
women deserved the same opportunity as wealthier women to regulate 
their fertility, and [that] all women had the right to control their bodies 
and use contraceptives if they wished.”60 With Fujimori’s control over 
Congressional action, the Ministry of Health soon drafted its first com-
prehensive reproductive health program.61 Additional government 
measures—including creating agencies and passing laws—also stressed 
the importance of equality between men and women.62 
 The government’s aggressive Family Planning Program focused 
on increasing the number of sterilizations performed on Peruvian 
women and specifically targeted the low-income, indigenous women 
at the margins of society.63 Moreover, government officials deter-
mined annual numeric goals and targets for the sterilization programs 
and initiated an obligatory quota system for health care providers to 
meet as program employees in order to remain employed, obtain 
monetary compensation, or receive a promotion.64 Later investiga-
tions revealed that health care provider practices included compen-
sating women and subjecting them to aggression, intimidation, and 
                                                                                                                      
tee for the Defense of Women’s Rights] (CLADEM) & Ctr. for Reprod. L. and Pol’y 
(CRLP), Silence and Complicity: Violence Against Women in Peruvian Public 
Health Facilities 36 (1999) [hereinafter CLADEM & CRLP]. 
58 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 20. See Coe, supra note 29, at 59. A Program Manager 
at the Ministry of Health made the following statement in 1998: 
The fertility rate among poor women is 6.9 children—they are poor and are 
producing more poor people. The president is aware that the government 
cannot fight poverty without reducing poor people’s fertility. Thus, demo-
graphic goals are a combination of the population’s right to access family 
planning and the government’s anti-poverty strategy. 
Coe, supra note 29, at 61–62. 
59 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 138. 
60 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 138–39. 
61 Coe, supra note 29, at 60. 
62 Id. at 61. 
63 Id. at 62; see Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 20; Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 138. 
64 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 20; Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; CLADEM 
& CRLP, supra note 57, at 63; Coe, supra note 29, at 62. 
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humiliation—all measures that did not include informed consent.65 
For example, health care providers denied women their fundamental 
rights to informed consent when professionals pressured women to 
undergo surgical sterilization during “Tubal Ligation Festivals” and at 
locations designated for food aid distribution.66 Some providers of-
fered women surgical sterilization as the only free method of contra-
ception available.67 Other health workers did not provide women with 
information regarding other available birth control methods and 
many times deliberately gave inaccurate information about the risks 
and consequences of surgical sterilization procedures.68 Some women 
even reported that professionals in clinics and hospitals intimidated 
them as they sought medical attention for abortion complications.69 
 The practice of State-sponsored enforced sterilization also caused 
numerous deaths due to medical negligence and malpractice.70 Hu-
man rights groups brought one illustrative case, María Mamérita Me-
stanza Chávez v. Perú, to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights when a thirty-three-year-old, low-income, illiterate woman with 
seven children died after a coerced surgical sterilization procedure.71 
Health officials falsely accused Mestanza of violating the law by having 
more than five children and threatened to report her to the authori-
ties if she did not submit to surgical sterilization.72 Health care pro-
viders succeeded in coercing Mestanza to undergo a tubal ligation 
procedure and failed to examine her prior to the surgery.73 Following 
the tubal ligation procedure, the health center released Mestanza 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. Coe treads lightly on blame when talking about the 
abuses that occurred. See id. She shows how sterilization was promoted through services 
that withheld temporary methods of birth control, such as injections and birth control 
pills. Id. She does conclude by saying that “[b]latant deception, economic incentives and 
threats were also used,” but she does not mention the extent of the abuses. See id. 
66 See Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 63–64 
(information taken from collective interviews of health care providers). 
67 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 63–64. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 64. 
70 See Cáceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; Gonzalo E. Gianella, ¿Por qué Tendría que 
Haber Sucedido de Otro Modo? Notas Sobre Esterilizaciones y Genocidio en el Perú, Ciberayllu, Aug. 
30, 2004, http://www.andes.missouri.edu/andes/Ciberayllu.shtml. 
71 María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Perú, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
71/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003). See Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., Briefing 
Paper: Reproductive Rights in the Inter-American System for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights 15 (2002), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/ 
pdf/pub_bp_rr_interamerican.pdf. [hereinafter Ctr. for Reprod. Rts.]. 
72 See Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., supra note 71, at 15. 
73 See id. 
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even though they were aware that she suffered from serious complica-
tions as a result of the surgery.74 A few days later, Mestanza’s partner 
attempted to seek emergency medical care from physicians at the 
health center, but the physicians refused and reassured him that the 
effects of the anesthesia had not yet worn off.75 As a result, Mestanza 
died in her home nine days after her surgical sterilization.76 
 Coerced and forced sterilization practices contradict Peru’s con-
stitutional and legal protections for its citizens.77 At first, human 
rights activists and non-governmental organizations criticized the 
government’s focus on high numeric goals that were bound to lead to 
abuses, as the practices were extremely secretive.78 Later, women’s ad-
vocacy groups documented the specific instances of abuse and sent 
their findings to the Public Ombudsman on Women’s Rights.79 Fi-
nally, in December 1997, La República, one of Peru’s major newspa-
pers, reported an independent investigation and detailed findings on 
the population policy implementation that shocked the public.80 
 Once the general public became aware of the extent of Fuji-
mori’s demographic policy, a heated debate ensued.81 The Ombuds-
man’s office released a report in 1998 of its findings of abuse and rec-
ommended reforms in the government’s family planning programs.82 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. These acts could be considered genocide, as will be 
discussed herein. See infra notes 135–171 and accompanying text. The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide to include meas-
ures intended to prevent births within the group committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. See Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The difficulty with proving these sterili-
zations as genocide is proving the specific intent to destroy the Quechua people. See Geno-
cide Convention, supra; see also Part III(B), infra, for further discussion. 
78 See Coe, supra note 29, at 63. 
79 See id. Today, groups of victims-survivors exist to provide support and document the 
abuses. See Emily Koren, Contra Su Voluntad: The Involuntary Sterilizations of Peru’s Family 
Planning Program International Human Rights Advocacy Report 8 (May 22, 2008) (un-
published report, The Center for International Human Rights Advocacy at the University 
of Denver) (on file with the author). For instance, La Organización de Mujeres Esterilizadas 
Contra Su Voluntad (The Association of Women Sterilized Against Their Will) provides 
support to more than 1000 women members in the Cusco region. Id. 
80 See Coe, supra note 29, at 63. The title of the article was “Ligations in exchange for 
food.” Id. at 63 n.38. 
81 Id. at 63. 
82 Id.; Defensoría del Pueblo, Serie Informes Defensiorales No. 7, Anticoncep-
ción Quirúrgica Voluntaria I: Casos Investigados por la Defensoría del Pueblo 
(1998). 
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Other organizations then backed the report and also pressured the 
Peruvian government to take action to reform its policies.83 In March 
1998, the Ministry of Health agreed to make changes and reform ster-
ilization services; it eliminated the quotas and implemented new 
counseling guidelines, a consent form, a three-day waiting period be-
fore the procedure, a day to recover in a hospital after the surgery, 
and certification of health care facilities and physicians.84 Addition-
ally, in 2001, the Peruvian government agreed to settle the case pend-
ing in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by compen-
sating María Mestanza’s family and by taking responsibility for 
violating individual human rights, including the rights to life, physical 
integrity and humane treatment, equal protection, and the right to be 
free from gender-based violence.85 As part of the settlement, the gov-
ernment promised to investigate other enforced sterilization cases 
and to punish those who had violated Peruvian and international 
law.86 At the time of this writing, however, the Peruvian government 
has not fully complied with its commitments under the Mestanza set-
tlement.87 
II. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  
Its Mandate and Findings 
 Soon after the government reformed its Family Planning Program, 
Peru’s transition to democracy began in September 2000.88 This regime 
change was not due, however, to public outrage at the atrocities com-
mitted during Fujimori’s regime, but was largely the result of televised 
videos that uncovered a political corruption scandal and implicated 
high-level government and military officials, including the head of 
Peru’s intelligence service, Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), 
Vladimiro Montesinos.89 Fujimori fled the country in November 2000 
and resigned as president via fax from Japan.90 Thus, unlike the Chil-
                                                                                                                      
83 Coe, supra note 29, at 63. 
84 Id. 
85 Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., supra note 71, at 16. 
86 Id. 
87 Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Annual Report of the IACHR 2007: Status of 
Compliance with the Recommendations of the IACHR (2007), http://www.cidh.org/ 
annualrep/2007eng/Chap.2.htm. 
88 See Conaghan, supra note 49, at 227–34. 
89 See id. at 228. 
90 See González Cueva, supra note 29, at 74. In the end, Congress did not accept Fuji-
mori’s letter of resignation and declared him morally unfit to serve as president. Cona-
ghan, supra note 49, at 241. 
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ean or El Salvadoran transitions, Peru’s was a total regime collapse 
without a negotiated arrangement, peace accord, or guarantee of im-
punity.91 The peaceful transition to Valentín Paniagua’s interim gov-
ernment and the favorable conditions for democratic transition—the 
complete collapse of authoritarian rule and the absence of a powerful 
insurgency—provided an opportunity to critically examine the past and 
to establish a legitimate democratic regime that would guarantee future 
individual and collective human rights—including reproductive 
rights—in Peru.92 
 In response to public and social group pressure, the newly-formed 
government established the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (CVR)93 in June 2001 to investigate human rights abuses com-
mitted during the twenty-year internal conflict.94 The CVR—composed 
of ten men, two women, and one Quechua-speaker95—was responsible 
for determining the conditions that precipitated the violent conflict, 
assisting with judicial investigations, drafting reparations proposals, and 
recommending reforms.96 Specifically, the CVR mandate charged the 
Commission with “clarifying the process, facts and responsibilities of 
the terrorist violence and human rights violations produced from May 
1980 to November 2000, whether imputable to terrorist organizations 
or State agents, as well as proposing initiatives destined to affirm peace 
and harmony among Peruvians.”97 This broad and inclusive directive 
included interpreting and writing the collective memory of the histori-
cal period and fact-finding in individual cases.98 The mandate also al-
lowed the Commission to determine the appropriateness of identifying 
perpetrators who violated criminal law on condition that the responsi-
bilities for such actions would be presumptive and were meant to assist 
                                                                                                                      
91 González Cueva, supra note 26, at 73–74. Fujimori, unlike Pinochet, was an exile 
without credibility or impunity. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 332–39. 
92 See Supreme Resolution 304–2000-JUS. (2000) (Peru); González Cueva, supra note 
26, at 74–76. 
93 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú. 
94 See Hayner, supra note 8, at 260. 
95 See Degregori, supra note 20. The one Quechua-speaker was Alberto Morote Sánchez, 
a former Rector of the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconcilación, Nuestra Labor: Comisionado, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/lacomision/ 
nlabor/comisionado.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); Sabrina Marian Reisinger, Truth, Race 
and Reconciliation; Ayacucho and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Nov. 
8, 2005) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State University), http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/ 
available/etd-11082005-203231/. 
96 Hayner, supra note 8, at 260–61. 
97 Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM art. 1, translated in González Cueva, supra note 26, 
at 75. 
98 See Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM art. 2; González Cueva, supra note 26, at 75. 
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the Public Prosecutor99 and the courts in their constitutionally granted 
duties.100 
 One example of the expansive nature of the CVR mandate is the 
Commission’s sweeping subject-matter jurisdiction.101 The list of crimes 
included the phrase “and other serious injuries” after the crime of tor-
ture, and the phrase “[o]ther crimes and serious violations of the rights 
of individuals” to possibly include further abuses of State power, such as 
sex crimes, forced internal displacements, due process violations and 
genocide.102 Similarly, the decree authorized the CVR to focus on 
“[v]iolations of the collective rights of the country’s Andean and native 
communities.”103 Moreover, the mandate broadly defined personal ju-
risdiction to leave open the possibility to examine acts committed by 
State agents, members of “terrorist organizations” and members of pa-
ramilitary organizations.104 This grant of jurisdiction was in direct op-
position to Fujimori’s 1995 amnesty laws and signified a possible end to 
the impunity that security forces had enjoyed under Fujimori’s re-
gime.105 
 The CVR embarked on the country’s largest and most ambitious 
human rights project in Peruvian history and clarified the magnitude 
                                                                                                                      
99 Ministerio Público. 
100 González Cueva, supra note 26, at 75, 80; González Cueva Interview, supra note 48. 
101 See Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM art. 3. “The Truth Commission shall focus its 
work on . . . 
(a) Murders and kidnappings; 
(b) Forced disappearances; 
(c) Torture and other serious injuries; 
(d) Violations of the collective rights of the country’s Andean and native com-
munities; 
(e) Other crimes and serious violations of the rights of individuals.” 
Id., translated in González Cueva, supra note 26, at 92. 
102 Id.; González Cueva, supra note 26, at 76 (noting that the question as to what law to 
apply was hotly debated in the Commission’s Working Group). The Ministry of Justice 
included the application of International Human Rights Law and International Humani-
tarian Law. See González Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. The representatives of the security 
forces rejected the inclusion of the laws of war, as these laws would implicitly give the 
twenty-year conflict internal armed conflict status. See id. 
103 Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM art. 3, translated in González Cueva, supra note 26, 
at 92. 
104Id. arts. 1 & 3; González Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. Later talks would apply the “pa-
ramilitary groups” category to the several death squads that emerged during the two dec-
ades of conflict either indirectly or directly under the auspices of the Armed Forces. See 
González Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. 
105 See Law 26479 of June 14, 1995 (Peru); Law 26492 of June 28, 1995 (Peru); Gon-
zález Cueva, supra note 26, at 72–73; González Cueva Interview, supra note 48. 
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of the atrocities committed by and against fellow Peruvians.106 The 
Commission’s findings in its August 2003 Final Report included statis-
tics showing that almost 70,000 people were killed or “disappeared,” 
and of those, more than ninety percent came from the eight poorest 
Andean and Amazonian regions.107 In addition, more than seventy per-
cent of victims spoke Quechua as their native language.108 Thus, the 
findings demonstrated that victims of the armed conflict were over-
whelmingly low-income, rural, indigenous peasants with little or no po-
litical or economic power in Peruvian society.109 
 As for those responsible for the conflict and its outcomes, the CVR 
promoted a comprehensive and inclusive notion of accountability.110 
The Final Report found State limitations in protecting fundamental 
rights of its citizens and securing the public order, as well as breaches of 
the constitutional order and rule of law in numerous moments of crisis 
throughout the internal conflict.111 Although the two terrorists groups— 
the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
(MRTA)—carried the bulk of the responsibility for systematic abuses 
and violence during the armed conflict, the Report also held state, po-
litical, and social entities responsible for many of the gross human rights 
violations.112 
III. Truth Omissions from the CVR’s Final Report 
A. Broad Mandate, Restricted Interpretation 
 Even with the CVR’s comprehensive and inclusive notions of ac-
countability, various organizations criticized and questioned the Com-
mission’s decision to exclude cases of violations with ambiguous or tan-
                                                                                                                      
106 See Degregori, supra note 20. The CVR collected nearly 17,000 testimonies from 
across the country, conducted almost 2000 interviews and talked to the main national po-
litical and military leaders during the years 1980–2000. Id. 
107 See Degregori, supra note 20. 
108 Id. The Final Report also gives the astonishing statistic that according to the 1993 cen-
sus, only sixteen percent of the Peruvian population were native Quechua-speakers. Final 
Report, supra note 9, at I(6). Also, the people from these regions together represent only 
nine percent of the income of all Peruvian families. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 15. 
109 See Final Report, supra note 9, at I(6); Degregori, supra note 20. 
110 See Final Report, supra note 9, passim (holding accountable the Shining Path, the 
MRTA, Peruvian police and Armed Forces, self-defense committees, the various govern-
ment parties in power during the conflict, the Peruvian legislature and judiciary, trade 
organizations, the educational system, the Church, human rights organizations, and the 
media). 
111 See id. at I(10)–(11). 
112 See id. at II–V. 
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gential relations to the armed conflict in the Final Report.113 Without a 
general policy to guide decision-making among the Commission’s re-
gional offices, Commissioners drew different lines as to which cases to 
investigate and publish under the mandate.114 As a result, cases such as 
those of the enforced sterilizations during the Fujimori regime were 
not considered in the context of insurgency or counter-insurgency and 
thus were seen by some of the Commissioners as outside of the Com-
mission’s mandate and not included in the CVR’s Final Report.115 
 Because the Executive gave the CVR a sufficiently broad mandate 
to include State-sponsored enforced sterilizations, the Commission’s 
omission was a self-imposed, interpretive—albeit inattentive— restric-
tion on the Commission’s investigation and Final Report.116 Of course, 
truth commissioners must make certain choices as to which cases 
commissions investigate and report as a result of time constraints, re-
source limits, insufficient information, unreliable evidence, repetition 
of wrongs already documented elsewhere, and political pressures.117 
Reports should not, however, exclude cases of gross human rights viola-
tions if the effects are to perpetuate discrimination, racism, and clas-
sism as well as to impede justice, including reproductive justice, for vic-
tims.118 Rather, commissioners should make a careful and conscientious 
effort to investigate and report abuses committed against the most dis-
enfranchised members of society, especially when their mandate so re-
quires, but even when it is ambiguous.119 In the case of the CVR, its 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 19–20; interview with Carlos Iván Degregori, for-
mer Commissioner of the Peruvian Truth Commission, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Nov. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter Degregori Interview]. 
114 See id. 
115 See Gianella, supra note 70, at 3; Guilia Tamayo, Metas que Matan, http://w3. 
desco.org.pe/publicaciones/QH/QH/qh111gt.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). During sepa-
rate interviews, two of the Peruvian Truth Commission’s Commissioners, Salomón Lerner 
Febres and Carlos Iván Degregori, stated that they did not think that these enforced steriliza-
tion cases were within the Truth Commission’s mandate. However, after looking at the text of 
the mandate once more, each one remarked that these cases could have been included in 
the mandate and that they were overlooked due to a lack of time and resources. Degregori 
Interview, supra note 113; Interview with Salomón Lerner Febres, former President of the 
Peruvian Truth Commission, in Lima, Perú ( June 15, 2006) [hereinafter Lerner Febres In-
terview]. 
116 See Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM; Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner 
Febres Interview, supra note 115. 
117 See Hayner, supra note 8, at 73. 
118 See id. at 24–31, 73; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 1–2, 19–20. 
119 See Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM, passim; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
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mandate’s broad language required an investigation of enforced sterili-
zations.120 Priscilla Hayner argues that: 
[T]he practice of rape and other sexual crimes should be fully 
acknowledged in a commission’s report where it is believed 
such a practice was widespread. If a truth commission does 
not take special care in addressing this issue, it is likely that it 
will remain largely shrouded in silence and hidden from the 
history books—and also likely that few policy, educational, or 
reparatory measures will be put in place to assist past victims, 
increase the public understanding of the issue, or reduce the 
prevalence of sexual abuse in the future.121 
In the cases of enforced sterilizations, the CVR did not make such a 
conscientious, inclusive effort.122 As a result, impoverished, indigenous 
Quechua-speaking women continued to face multiple layers of dis-
crimination—including social, racial, and gender discrimination—first 
as victims and later as unrecognized victims of State repression and de-
nial of basic human rights during the twenty-year internal conflict.123 
Thus, the omission of enforced sterilization cases excluded women who 
were already members of socially and politically marginalized groups 
and greatly decreased their chances for truth, accountability, and jus-
tice in Peruvian society.124 
 The CVR Commissioners could give reasons for excluding enforced 
sterilization cases from their investigation and report, such as the man-
date’s restriction or the repetition of other investigations or reports, but 
none should outweigh the reasons to include such widespread, State-
sponsored violations of reproductive rights as part of Peru’s official col-
lective memory.125 First, Commissioners did not see enforced steriliza-
tions as an included crime in the Truth Commission’s mandate.126 In 
contrast to the CVR’s inclusive mandate, the mandate of the South Afri-
                                                                                                                      
120 See Supreme Decree 065–2001-PCM, passim. 
121 Hayner, supra note 8, at 78–79. 
122 See id.; Final Report, supra note 9, passim. 
123 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
124 See id. at 1–2, 19–20; Hayner, supra note 8, at 24–31; Minow, supra note 4, at 24–27. 
125 See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner Febres Interview, supra note 115. In 
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sterilizations cases by pointing to the separate investigations and reports written on the 
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can Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not cover all of 
the abusive practices of apartheid, especially with regards to detention 
without trial, racial segregation, and the practice of “forced removals” of 
blacks to barren lands.127 Failing to include these and other apartheid 
practices in the final report, even where justified because the practices 
were already well-documented, “prevented many South Africans from 
seeing their own personal experience reflected in the commission’s 
work.”128 Despite its restrictive mandate, the South African TRC held 
institutional hearings and found fault with some social and institutional 
structures of the apartheid system.129 This limited investigation, how-
ever, did not counter the South African TRC’s inclusion of mostly ex-
treme violence to the exclusion of a comprehensive investigation and 
report on the widespread State-sponsored systematic abuses committed 
against many Africans.130 This exclusion, as a result, hindered the TRC’s 
goal to ensure social justice for the African majority.131 
 Unlike the South African TRC, however, the Peruvian CVR’s ex-
ecutive mandate did not limit the scope of investigations or reports to 
exclude enforced sterilizations.132 In fact, it specifically endorsed a 
broad mandate which could have included systemic abuses such as co-
erced surgical sterilizations.133 Although the CVR’s Final Report did 
recognize the rights of women and the gross violations of human 
rights—including finding rape to be an instrument of torture— com-
mitted against women largely by the Peruvian Armed Forces, it still fell 
short by excluding gross, systematic human rights abuses of enforced 
sterilizations against mainly low-income, indigenous Quechua 
women.134 Because the decree did not make distinctions between those 
human rights violations directly related to insurgency or counter-
insurgency measures and those violations tangentially related, the 
Commissioners should not have made such distinctions that have led to 
the exclusion of more than 200,000 cases of enforced sterilizations 
from the Commission’s Final Report.135 In doing so, the Commission 
allowed Lima, the capital city and center of political discourse and pub-
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130 See id. at 35. 
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134 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 8, at 18, 19–20; Final Report, supra note 9, at III(A)(46). 
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lic opinion, to remain “emotionally distant” from these victims of State-
supported violence and helped to further alienate many victims from 
the CVR’s work.136  In this regard, the CVR helps to perpetuate and le-
gitimize physical, racial, and class divides in Peruvian society and im-
pedes public support for accountability and reproductive justice 
through the rule of law.137 
 Additionally, the CVR Commissioners’ reasoning did not apply in 
all cases since they were inconsistent when they investigated and pub-
lished other crimes Fujimori committed—largely in the context of 
political corruption and authoritarian rule—during his regime that 
may not directly relate to the insurgency or counter-insurgency.138 Be-
cause incontrovertible evidence that demonstrated high levels of state 
and political corruption naturally affected Peruvians with economic 
and political power, public outrage and media coverage demanded 
that the CVR investigate and record those atrocities.139 Therefore, 
those abuses of power became part of the historical record, and ef-
forts today continue to push for accountability and criminal responsi-
bility for the corruption crimes that Fujimori committed against Pe-
ruvians.140 In the end, this inconsistency and selective treatment of 
cases demonstrates that, at least for the excluded victims of enforced 
sterilization, the truth-seeking process cannot be seen as “more than 
the reconfiguration of government pacts or domination between el-
ites.”141 As a result, in this version of reconciliation, the same speakers 
are speaking and the same voiceless victims are silenced.142 
B. Enforced Sterilizations of Quechua Women as Genocide 
1. The Elements of Genocide 
 When a Congressional subcommittee investigated cases of en-
forced sterilizations and issued its report, it accused the Fujimori re-
gime of committing genocide against the Quechua people through the 
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Family Planning Program.143 There are arguments for and against clas-
sifying these cases of enforced sterilizations as acts of genocide, and 
these arguments will be discussed below.144 Ultimately, however, the 
victims of these human rights abuses need an impartial, independent 
investigation to take these issues out of the political realm and into the 
discourse of individual and collective reparations as well as reproduc-
tive justice.145 
 First, the term “genocide” combines the Greek word genos (race or 
tribe) with the Latin suffix -cide (killing), and is the intentional killing, 
destruction or extermination of groups or members of a group.146 The 
crime of genocide is recognized as part of customary international law 
and a part of jus cogens, the body of peremptory international norms.147 
In addition, Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as follows: 
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; 
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.148 
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The definition deliberately omits acts of cultural and political genocide, 
and the Convention provides an ineffective enforcement through do-
mestic trials in the state where the genocide occurred.149 Much pro-
gress, however, has occurred at the international level to prosecute and 
punish perpetrators of genocide. For example, the statutes of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) provide for criminal action against perpe-
trators of genocide.150 The ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have tried individuals charged with geno-
cide and have delivered landmark decisions that shape the evolving 
standards and norms for this crime against humanity.151 
 In order to prove genocide, victims must fall under one or more of 
the definition’s enumerated groups.152 To determine whether an enu-
merated group exists in a particular case, a court may analyze subjective 
criteria, objective criteria, or both.153 In a subjective analysis, the court 
“tak[es] into account the relevant evidence and the political and cul-
tural context of the society concerned” on a case-by-case basis.154 For 
instance, in the case of Rwanda, the court examined the perceptions of 
Hutu and Tutsi members as well as Rwandan authorities adopted from 
colonial rule that Hutus and Tutsis belonged to two distinct ethnic 
groups.155 Alternatively, the court may use objective facts that indicate a 
population is a group with a distinct identity, such as state recognition 
or customary practices.156 In the case of Rwanda, the government re-
quired every citizen to carry identity cards displaying their ethnic iden-
tity as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and the country’s legislation at the time re-
ferred to citizens by their respective ethnic groups.157 
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 In addition, a perpetrator commits genocide through the defini-
tion’s enumerated discriminatory acts or omissions with the necessary 
mens rea.158 These acts or omissions, however, do not necessarily in-
volve the actual extinction or annihilation of the group, and motive is 
not an element of the crime of genocide.159 Thus, the individual ac-
cused of genocide must have either known or should have known that 
“his act [or omission] would destroy, in whole or in part [the] pro-
tected group.”160 In contrast to the crime against humanity of perse-
cution, which requires a discriminatory intent, genocide requires that 
the prosecution prove the accused possessed the specific intent to de-
stroy a particular group beyond a reasonable doubt.161 
 In order to prove genocidal intent, the prosecution must show that 
the accused wanted either to destroy a large number of group members 
or to exterminate a limited number of group members selected be-
cause their annihilation would greatly impact the group’s survival.162 
Thus, killing or sterilizing a large number of women group members 
who are of child bearing age can be considered genocide even though 
they do not comprise a large percentage of the group’s population.163 
Also, the accused must form his specific intent to commit genocide be-
fore acting in furtherance of the genocidal intent.164 
 Although the crimes committed must demonstrate genocidal in-
tent, the prosecution can prove the element of intent by inferring from 
“facts such as words or deeds or a pattern of purposeful action that de-
liberately, consistently, and systematically targets victims on account of 
their membership of a particular group while excluding the members 
of other groups.”165 Evidence to construct genocidal intent may include 
the general context of other acts committed against the same group, 
the physical targeting of the group, the extent of bodily injury, the me-
thodical nature of planning, and the scale of actual or attempted de-
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struction of the group.166 In the end, even though it is difficult to prove 
genocidal intent in the case of an individual backed by the State, prov-
ing the required specific intent for genocide is somewhat easier than 
originally anticipated through the use of circumstantial evidence.167 
2. Applying the Elements of Genocide Under the Convention to the 
Case of Enforced Sterilizations in Peru 
 A strong case can be made that the enforced sterilizations of more 
than 200,000 low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women were 
acts of genocide.168 First, the indigenous Quechua-speaking women are 
members of two protected groups enumerated in the definition of 
genocide since the Quechua people are a distinct racial and ethnic 
group in Peru.169 The indigenous Quechua people objectively belong 
to a racial group since they share common, constant, and hereditary 
features, and are an ethnic group since they are “a community of per-
sons linked by the same customs, the same language and the same 
race.”170 Additionally, from a subjective analysis, the racial and ethnic 
divides among criollos, mestizos, cholos, and indígenas in Peruvian society 
also contribute to the notion that the Quechua people are a distinct 
cultural group.171 Although the overt motive behind Fujimori’s Family 
Planning Program was to curb population growth and to alleviate pov-
erty on a massive scale, it is clear that because motive is not an element 
of genocide, indigenous Quechua women would not lose their pro-
tected group status.172 In other words, their protected status as mem-
bers of a racial or ethnic group would override their status as a member 
of a particular social demographic.173 Therefore, the motive of popula-
tion control would not negate an intention to prevent births within the 
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group.174 As a result, one could prove that Fujimori’s Family Planning 
Program intended to prevent births among the Quechua people, de-
spite his alleged motives.175 
 Next, those individuals responsible for orchestrating enforced ster-
ilizations against indigenous Quechua women arguably acted with the 
necessary mens rea to commit genocide since they knew or should have 
known that these coercive sterilizations would destroy, in whole or in 
part, the Quechua people.176 Highly probative evidence with which one 
could infer genocidal intent would include the Family Planning Pro-
gram’s specific targeting of poor indigenous women and the systematic 
nature of its quota system, articulated in the 1989 Plan for a Govern-
ment of National Reconstruction, or “Plan Verde.”177 Specifically, the 
Plan stated that it was necessary to quickly curb population growth and 
mandate treatment for the “surplus beings [through a] generalized 
sterilization use among those culturally backward and impoverished 
groups.”178 The Plan continued by arguing that because those individu-
als from the targeted areas possessed “incorrigible characters” and 
lacked resources, all that was left was their “total extermination.”179 
Seeking out particular groups to sterilize in violation of reproductive 
rights and imposing upon health care providers an obligatory quota 
system which caused coercive practices demonstrate a destructive pat-
tern on the part of government officials to prevent births within the 
                                                                                                                      
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 Kittichaisaree, supra note 146, at 72 (quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 
¶ 520). 
177 See Historia de una Traición: Muchos Misterios Quedarán Revalados al Conocerse el Plan 
Militar que Se Consolidó el 5-IV-92, at 9 (1993), http://www.resistencia.org/documentos/el_ 
plan_verde/historia_de_una_traicion.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008); Amnesty Int’l, supra 
note 8, at 20. 
178 Historia de una Traición, supra note 177, at 9 (author’s translation). The Plan reads 
in Spanish: 
Ha quedado demonstrado la necesidad de frenar lo más pronto posible el 
crecimiento demográfico y urge, adicionalmente, un tratamiento para los ex-
cedentes existentes: utilización generalizada de esterilización en los grupos 
culturalmente atrasados y económicamente pauperizados . . . . Los métodos 
compulsivos deben tener solo cáracter experimental, pero deben ser norma 
en todos los centros de salúd la ligadura de trompas . . . . Hay que discriminar 
el excedente poblacional y los sectores nocivos de la población. Para estos 
sectores, dado su cáracter de incorrigibles y la carencia de recursos . . . solo 
queda su exterminio total. 
Id. 
179 Id.(author’s translation). 
2009] Enforced Sterilization & the Peruvian Truth Commission 27 
indigenous Quechua-speaking population.180 Moreover, under Fuji-
mori’s population control program, there existed a clear pattern of vic-
tims—namely poor, indigenous Quechua-speaking women—a high 
level of planning at the state level through the formal Family Planning 
Program, and a large number of victims considering that in 1993 only a 
fifth of Peru’s population spoke Quechua or other native languages.181 
 On the other hand, there are legal and practical concerns with 
classifying the enforced sterilization of Quechua women as an act of 
genocide.182 For example, one could argue that the State did not ad-
minister population control and family planning programs to Quechua 
women to the exclusion of other racial and ethnic groups from en-
forced sterilization procedures.183 This argument is weak, however, be-
cause perpetrators of genocide can theoretically have the specific intent 
to destroy more than one protected group under the auspices of a sin-
gle State-sponsored plan to eradicate poverty and curb population 
growth through sterilization procedures.184 Also, as a practical matter, 
conservative groups in Peru and abroad who oppose contraception and 
reproductive choice for women have capitalized on the classification of 
the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program as an act of genocide.185 
As a result, international human rights advocates who promote ac-
countability and justice for crimes against humanity and genocide must 
make strategic choices since their decisions and actions could nega-
tively affect future reproductive rights, choice, and health among 
Quechua women who have already been victims of State-enforced ster-
ilization campaigns.186 
C. Enforced Sterilizations as Violations of Individual Human Rights 
 Aside from the viable claim that the systematic enforced steriliza-
tions against Quechua women constituted an act of genocide, these ac-
tions also implicate numerous violations of other human rights, includ-
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ing reproductive rights, under national, regional, and international 
law.187 Legal instruments that obligate Peru to protect women against 
enforced sterilization include, but are not limited to, the Peruvian Con-
stitution,188 the American Convention on Human Rights (American 
Convention),189 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),190 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR),191 and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).192 The protective 
provisions enumerated within these instruments include those that pro-
tect the right to personal autonomy, privacy, bodily integrity, and 
autonomous decision-making in women’s reproductive lives.193 
 For instance, the Peruvian Constitution guarantees all Peruvians 
the right to dignity; life; moral, psychological, and physical integrity; 
liberty and security of the person; and to be free from all forms of vio-
lence and from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment.194 Thus, 
the State has the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights 
through national laws and legal mechanisms to investigate and punish 
violations. In the case of enforced sterilizations, the Peruvian gov-
ernment has enacted laws to protect women; however, these laws are 
not enforced and violators continue to enjoy impunity from punish-
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ment.195 Even though abuses such as enforced sterilizations have been 
documented, public authorities have dismissed the violations as iso-
lated incidents, and health care professionals paternalistically defend 
their actions as beneficial to their patients and “intended to avoid 
greater injury to the patient.”196 In light of these protections, women 
victims of enforced sterilizations have viable claims at the national 
level to remedy the wrongs committed against them.197 
 Many of these national protections, however, are unenforceable or 
inaccessible to the low-income women-victims of the Voluntary Surgical 
Contraception program.198 Thus, complaints to regional or interna-
tional human rights bodies are also valid and actionable claims.199 The 
American Convention, for example, protects individuals’ rights to life; 
personal integrity; health; to provide free and informed consent; pri-
vacy; equality; and non-discrimination.200 Public health care providers 
violated these rights when they performed unnecessary surgery on 
women-victims without obtaining informed consent, as well as when, in 
certain circumstances, they failed to perform preliminary examinations 
or to give post-operative care, which ultimately led to death and disabil-
ity for women-victims.201 
 Under the ICCPR, Peru has committed itself to respect, protect 
and fulfill its citizens’ civil and political rights, including the rights to 
life, non-discrimination, gender equality, liberty, personal security, 
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and privacy, along with freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.202 Additionally, the ICESCR protects the rights 
to non-discrimination, equality, and health.203 Similarly, under the 
CEDAW, Peru guarantees rights to women that protect against en-
forced sterilization under Articles 5, 12, and 16, which are further ar-
ticulated in General Recommendations 19, 21, and 24.204 For exam-
ple, in General Recommendation 19, the CEDAW Committee asks 
States to take measures to “prevent coercion in regard to fertility and 
reproduction.”205 All of these State duties at international law give in-
dividual women-victims of enforced sterilizations the ability to hold 
the Peruvian government responsible for the human rights violations 
committed against them. 
 The Peruvian government officially acknowledged State responsi-
bility for violations of international law under the American Convention 
when it settled the case of María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez v. Perú.206 
Specifically, the settlement agreement recognized State violations of the 
victim’s rights to life, physical integrity, humane treatment, equal protec-
tion of the law, and freedom from gender-based violence.207 Although 
settlement agreements with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights are not binding jurisprudence at international law, these recogni-
tions of State responsibility are highly persuasive admissions to use in 
any further legal action at the regional or international levels.208 More-
over, the Peruvian government undertook to investigate and punish 
those responsible for the violations as well as to reform legislation and 
create procedures to handle patient complaints within the health care 
system.209 As a result, ongoing rights violations are occurring as long as 
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Peru fails to implement these changes and denies women-victims their 
rights at national, regional, and international law.210 
D. The Need for an Independent and Impartial Investigation 
 The CVR Commissioners recognized that other bodies within 
Peru’s government and civil society either had conducted or were in 
the process of conducting their own investigations and reports on the 
cases of enforced sterilizations.211 Although a Congressional subcom-
mittee and numerous activist groups investigated and published tes-
timonies and cases condemning the State’s Family Planning Program 
and its health care providers, members of each of these bodies had a 
specific political or social interest in advocating certain positions and 
conclusions.212 In contrast, the CVR was in a unique and disinterested 
position to evaluate, as it could have based “conclusions and recom-
mendations on a close study of the record, while standing as an inde-
pendent institution separate from the systems under review.”213 Opin-
ion polls in Lima confirmed the public confidence in the 
performance of the CVR and the positive impact the public saw the 
Final Report have on Peru.214 In addition, most individuals opined 
that the government should implement the CVR’s recommendations 
for reparations, reform, and justice.215 The CVR’s widespread public 
support and overall legitimacy helped create some institutional mo-
mentum to keep the possibility of criminal justice and accountability 
open for the future, but only for those cases investigated and re-
ported.216 Thus, the exclusion of State-sponsored enforced steriliza-
tions in the Final Report effectively impeded future criminal judicial 
action for thousands of marginalized Quechua women in Peru.217 
 The conservative Congressional Committee members who submit-
ted the final report on conclusions and recommendations in cases of 
State-led enforced sterilization campaigns have politicized these human 
rights abuses and have used human rights language to strategically re-
strict reproductive choice for Peruvian women through repeals of laws 
that make surgical sterilization a legal option for reproductive choice in 
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Peru.218 As mentioned above, these conservatives are utilizing their in-
vestigation and report on human rights abuses to recommend commit-
ting further human rights abuses against women.219 During the Toledo 
regime, reproductive rights and health advances had nearly halted.220 
For example, new policy initiatives stress abstinence-only methods for 
sexually transmissible infection (STI) prevention and natural methods 
for family planning.221 In addition, government agencies have stopped 
promoting gender equality and sexual education, and health officials 
have prevented access to services and information on modern methods 
of contraception.222 These programs and future strategies have further 
subordinated women in Peruvian society and have increased reliance on 
natural reproductive methods and unsafe abortions.223 
 Including the cases of enforced sterilizations in the CVR Final Re-
port or even creating a separate impartial truth commission investigat-
ing and reporting these State-sponsored abuses could have served to 
prevent claims of genocide from instilling fear and causing a conserva-
tive backlash in reproductive rights issues.224 In addition, including 
these cases in the Commission’s report could have created a legitimate 
independent declaration of human rights abuses as acts of genocide 
and as individual violations of reproductive choice and health.225 
Moreover, including these cases could have kept these human rights 
atrocities out of the political arena and in the hands of the victims who 
deserve retribution, reparations, and reconciliation.226 Although in-
cluding these abuses would not have guaranteed a tangible victory for 
the victims or their families, it would have constituted a moral, symbolic 
victory for low-income, rural Quechua women and a step forward in an 
uphill battle for recognition as Peruvian citizens.227 Though the Peru-
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vian government has issued a public apology for its mass sterilization 
campaign, excluding these cases from any commission of inquiry 
greatly reduces the possibility of individual accountability for the perpe-
trators and justice for the victims of enforced sterilizations in Peru.228 
Conclusion 
 A distinctive feature of truth commissions is their focus on victims, 
reconciliation, and healing as well as their reporting to create a frame-
work to ensure transitional justice as a mechanism to deal with a na-
tion’s past human rights abuses.229 One problem, however, is that truth-
telling can never be comprehensive enough to encompass all of the 
competing perceptions of past events.230 In addition, healing and jus-
tice—especially in the field of reproductive rights and justice—seem 
incompatible and unworkable where victims have no political power or 
economic means to reconcile and rebuild their communities.231 Com-
plex analyses by truth commissions, however, can produce a record and 
collective memory to prevent future human rights violations, and the 
exclusion of certain abuses creates a void in the attempt at finding 
truth, reconciliation, and justice for transitional states.232 
 For more than 200,000 indigenous Quechua-speaking women in 
Peru, time has not healed their wounds of the past. These individuals 
deserve a legitimate, independent, and thorough investigation of the 
human rights abuses committed against them. Even if a lack of re-
sources impedes the possibility for adequate monetary reparations or 
legal action for reproductive justice, a good faith inquiry to uncover the 
truth and an acknowledgement of past wrongs would constitute an im-
portant symbolic victory for indigenous rights, reproductive rights, and 
human rights for the indigenous Quechua peoples of Peru. Restoring 
dignity and recognizing individual rights of Quechua women could 
succeed as a step toward bridging the economic, racial, and ethnic di-
vides that continue to perpetuate inequality, discrimination, and hatred 
among Peruvians. 
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 Official acknowledgment of the truth is extremely powerful in the 
healing process, especially in an atmosphere previously dominated by 
official denial.233 If this is the case, then no official acknowledgment of 
truth after official denial can be equally powerful in impeding recon-
ciliation and healing. When truth commissions deprive certain indi-
viduals or groups of the opportunity to have their stories entered into 
the historical record, they effectively—even if inadvertently—deny vic-
tims access to the public and political discourse and leave victims dis-
empowered in their struggle for justice and accountability. Future truth 
commissions, thus, should ensure that the marginalized victims in soci-
ety do not remain silenced and alienated in the creation of the histori-
cal record and collective memory. When forgotten, history does have a 
tendency to repeat itself. 
                                                                                                                      
233See Hayner, supra note 8, at 27. 
